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Abstract
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1 Introduction
Decarbonization of the electric power source and electrification are key factors for cre-
ating a low carbon society.1 The Japanese government plans to reduce carbon dioxide
emissions by 80% by 2050 and has committed to the mid-term target of a 26% reduc-
tion in greenhouse gas emissions by 2030, compared with 2013 (Cabinet of Japan, 2018).
To achieve these targets, reducing emissions in the electricity market is very important
(Global Environment Committee, 2017).
Ministry of the Environment Japan plans to introduce carbon pricing through either
carbon tax or tradable permits in the electric power supply market. However, such carbon
pricing raises the electricity price, which can be an obstacle for electrification. In other
words, a higher electricity price will delay the switch from coal, oil, and gas to electricity.
Such a delay has already been observed in Japan. The Japanese government introduced
a feed-in-tariff for renewable energy in 2010, and its costs are financed by a specific tax
(surcharge) for electricity consumption. This has raised the price of electricity by ¥2.25
per KWh in 2016 (about 15%), and the surcharge rate is expected to become higher in
the near future. This will substantially reduce the competitive advantage of electricity
over fossil fuels (Advisory Committee for Natural Resources and Energy, 2018).
To strike a balance between lowering the emission intensity of the electric power
supply market and promoting electrification, the Ministry of the Environment proposed
using the revenue from carbon tax levied to electric power suppliers or from tradable
permits for reducing specific tax on electricity consumption (reducing the surcharge for
renewable energy). This will restrict the increase in electricity price but weaken the
incentive to reduce electricity consumption, which may be suboptimal. Nevertheless,
this policy may be a suitable option for promoting electrification.
Traditionally, the Japanese government regulates environmental efficiency based on
output level rather than on the total amount of emission or energy consumption. Fol-
1See Global Environment Committee (2017). Examples of electrification include the switch from
gasoline vehicles to electric vehicles and from boilers to electric heat pumps.
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lowing the Act on the Rational Use of Energy, which was originally enacted in 1979
and has been amended repeatedly, the Ministry of Economy, Trade, and Industry set
industry-specific per-output targets for the improvement of energy efficiency, and regu-
lates energy efficiency levels (Matsumura and Yamagishi, 2017). Moreover, the Ministry
of the Environment imposes energy efficiency regulation on power plants in addition to
regulating pollutant emissions. Regarding carbon dioxide emission, the government en-
couraged firms in the electricity market to adopt voluntary targets of emission intensity,
and firms have adopted the target emission level of 0.38 ton per kWh (Global Envi-
ronment Committee, 2017). Emission intensity regulation also has a weaker effect on
the restriction of consumption level than on the restriction of total emissions or carbon
pricing. Thus, the regulation may have a similar effect as that of the combination of
carbon pricing and refunding of the tax revenue to electricity consumers.2
In this study, we prove the equivalence of the emission intensity regulation and the
combination of carbon pricing and refunding of tax revenue to consumers. Our result
shows that emission intensity regulation is as reasonable as the above policy combination
for striking a balance between lowering the emission intensity and promoting electrifica-
tion.
2 The Model
We consider the following partial-equilibrium model wherein n firms choose output and
abatement levels. The model consists of a perfectly competitive market, and the demand
function is D(·). We assume that D′ < 0, as long as both the price and quantity are
positive. For i = 1, . . . , n, qi is firm i’s output, ai is the level of firm i’s abatement
activity, and ci(qi, ai) is firm i’s cost function. We assume ∂ci/∂qi > 0 and ∂ci/∂ai > 0
and that the function is strictly convex. ei(qi, ai) is firm i’s emission function. We assume
∂ei/∂qi > 0 and ∂ei/∂ai < 0 and that the function is convex. Each consumer faces the
2For examples and discussions on the emission intensity regulation and a comparison between emission
tax and emission intensity regulation, refer to Helfand (1991), Farzin (2003), and Lahiri and Ono (2007).
However, none discussed carbon pricing policies with refunds and compared these policies with the
emission intensity regulation.
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effective electricity price p + f , where p is the electricity price and f is the renewable
energy surcharge. We assume the interior solution (i.e., qi > 0, ai > 0, and ei > 0 at
equilibrium).
2.1 Tax-Revenue Refund
In this subsection, we consider the carbon pricing (emission tax) with refunds to con-
sumers. The government imposes emission tax with tax rate t > 0 and uses the tax
revenue to reduce f . f = F − s, where F is the surcharge before refunding and s is
the reduction of surcharge.3 The government chooses s to meet the budget constraint
tE = sQ, where E and Q are the expected total emission and total demand, respectively.
Firm i’s profit is pii = pqi−ci− tei. Each firm maximizes pii with respect to qi and ai,
given p and t. Let qTi (p; t) and a
T
i (p; t) be the profit-maximizing outcome under carbon
pricing given p and t, where the superscript “T” means “Tax.” The supply function is
given by S(p; t) :=
∑n
i=1 q
T
i (p; t). The supply-demand equilibrium is given by the market-
clearing condition S(p; t) = D(p+ f). From these conditions, we obtain the equilibrium
price pT and refund sT as well as obtain the equilibrium output qTi = q
T
i (p
T ; t) and
abatement aTi = a
T
i (p
T ; t).
2.2 Emission Intensity Regulation
In this subsection, we consider the emission intensity regulation. The government im-
poses emission intensity θ > 0. That is, the emission-to-output rate of each firm i needs
to be ei/qi ≤ θ. If ei is larger than θqi, firm i must purchase the permit from a firm
whose emission level is smaller than θqi.
4 Let r be the price of this permit. Because there
is no refunding, f = F .
3We assume F is exogenously given and sufficiently large so that F − s is never negative. If the
government adopts another type of carbon pricing—by introducing tradable permits of emission, selling
them through auction, and refunding the revenue from them to consumers—we obtain the same result.
However, if the government adopts grandfathering rather than auction, the equivalence does not hold,
because the government’s revenue from permits (and thus the amount of refunding) is smaller.
4In Japan, the government allows joint implementation by firms to meet the emission intensity regu-
lation. This is equivalent to allowing tradable permits. Note that in contrast with the standard tradable
permit policy with auction, the firm need not purchase the permit as long as the firm meets the emission
intensity regulation.
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Firm i’s profit is pii = pqi− ci−r(ei−θqi). Each firm maximizes pii with respect to qi
and ai, given p and r. Let q
I
i (p, r) and a
I
i (p, r) be the profit-maximizing outcomes under
the emission intensity regulation, given p and r, where the superscript “I” refers to “Inten-
sity.” The supply function of the electricity market is given by S(p, r) :=
∑n
i=1 q
I
i (p, r).
The supply-demand equilibrium of the electricity market is given by S(p, r) = D(p+F ).
The supply-demand equilibrium of the permit is given by
n∑
i=1
eIi (p, r) =
n∑
i=1
θqIi (p, r), (1)
where eIi (p, r) = ei(q
I
i (p, r), a
I
i (p, r)). From these conditions, we obtain the equilibrium
price pI and equilibrium permit price rI as well as obtain the equilibrium output qIi =
qIi (p
I , rI) and abatement aIi = a
I
i (p
I , rI).
3 Equivalence of the Two Policies
We now present our result on the equivalence of the two policies.
Proposition 1 For any t, there exists θ, and conversely, for any θ, there exists t such
that the two policies yield the same outputs and abatements (i.e., (qTi , a
T
i ) = (q
I
i , a
I
i ) for
all i) and thus the same emission levels (i.e., ei(q
T
i , a
T
i ) = ei(q
I
i , a
I
i ) for all i).
Proof. First, we show that for any t, there exists θ such that the emission intensity
regulation yields the same outcomes as those under the tax-revenue refund policy.
Consider the equilibrium outcomes under the tax-revenue refund policy. Regarding
the supply side, from the first-order conditions for firm i, we obtain
pT =
∂ci
∂q
(qTi , a
T
i ) + t
∂ei
∂q
(qTi , a
T
i ), (2)
−t∂ei
∂a
(qTi , a
T
i ) =
∂ci
∂a
(qTi , a
T
i ). (3)
Regarding the demand side, the inverse demand function is obtained as
p+ F − s = D−1(Q) ∴ p = D−1(Q)− F + s.
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From the market-clearing condition, we obtain Q = D(p + F − s) = ST (p; t) =∑n
i=1 q
T
i (p; t) when p = p
T and s = sT . Substituting this into (2), we can rewrite (2) as
D−1
(
n∑
i=1
qTi
)
− F + sT = ∂ci
∂q
(qTi , a
T
i ) + t
∂ei
∂q
(qTi , a
T
i ). (2’)
From the budget-balance condition, we obtain
t
n∑
i=1
ei(q
T
i , a
T
i ) = s
T
n∑
i=1
qTi . (4)
Here, (2’), (3), and (4) yield the equilibrium output qTi and abatement a
T
i for i = 1, . . . , n,
along with sT .
We now consider the equilibrium outcomes under the emission intensity regulation.
Regarding the supply side, from the first-order conditions for firm i, we obtain
pI + rIθ =
∂ci
∂q
(qIi , a
I
i ) + r
I ∂ei
∂q
(qIi , a
I
i ), (5)
−rI ∂ei
∂a
(qIi , a
I
i ) =
∂ci
∂a
(qIi , a
I
i ). (6)
Regarding the demand side,
p+ F = D−1(Q) ∴ p = D−1(Q)− F.
Using the market-clearing condition, we rewrite (5) as
D−1
(
n∑
i=1
qIi
)
− F + rIθ = ∂ci
∂q
(qIi , a
I
i ) + r
I ∂ei
∂q
(qIi , a
I
i ). (5’)
We now show that under the emission-intensity regulation, the following θ = θI yields
the same equilibrium outcome as that under the tax-revenue refund policy:
θI =
∑n
i=1 ei(q
T
i , a
T
i )∑n
i=1 q
T
i
. (7)
From (4), we obtain θI = sT /t.
If rI = t, the systems of equations (5’) and (6) are same as that of equations (2’) and
(3). This implies that if rI = t in equilibrium under the emission intensity regulation,
the market equilibrium outcomes are the same in both systems, that is, qIi = q
T
i and
aIi = a
T
i for i = 1, . . . , n.
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Finally, we show that the market-clearing condition is satisfied when r = t. This
condition (1) is satisfied because
n∑
i=1
ei(q
I
i , a
I
i ) =
n∑
i=1
ei(q
T
i , a
T
i ) = θ
I
n∑
i=1
qTi =
n∑
i=1
θIqIi ,
where the second equation stems from (7).
Next, we show that for any θ, there exists t such that the two policies yield the same
outcomes. We show that under the tax-revenue refund policy, setting t = rI yields the
same equilibrium outcome as that under the emission intensity regulation.
Under the tax-revenue refund policy, t = rI , and (4) implies that
sT = rI
∑n
i=1 ei(q
T
i , a
T
i )∑n
i=1 q
T
i
.
On the other hand, since (1) is satisfied for (qIi , a
I
i ) in the equilibrium under the emission
intensity regulation, θ =
∑n
i=1 ei(q
I
i , a
I
i )/
∑n
i=1 q
I
i holds. Substituting these into (2’) and
(5’), respectively, we find that the systems of (2’)-(3) and (5’)-(6) coincide. This implies
that qTi = q
I
i and a
T
i = a
I
i for i = 1, . . . , n. Q.E.D.
The intuition behind Proposition 1 is as follows. The tax-revenue refund policy
enhances electricity consumption. Through the market mechanism, it stimulates the
electricity supply. The emission intensity regulation stimulates electricity production
because each firm i obtains permits equal to θqi. Through the market mechanism, it
stimulates electricity consumption. With keeping these positive effects on consumption,
both the policies can adjust marginal costs of emission, t and r, at the same level.
Therefore, both the policies are equivalent.
4 Conclusion
Our result suggests that the government need not formulate a new policy for striking
the balance between lowering the emission intensity and promoting electrification. An
old policy, emission intensity regulation, is sufficient for such a purpose. Moreover, the
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emission intensity, θ, would be the direct policy target for this purpose rather than the
carbon price t. The current Japanese regulation may be too loose for ambitious targets,
and stricter regulation may be required. However, emission intensity regulation is a
reasonable policy tool for this purpose.
It is also worth noting that permit trading under the emission intensity regulation
has a practical property different from the standard cap-and-trade fashion. In the cap-
and-trade fashion, the government must consider how it initially distributes the permits.
However, the emission intensity regulation resolves this problem: the government only
needs to set a desired θ.
If we restrict our attention to symmetric firms, no firm trades permits in equilibrium.
Thus, without such permits, the equivalence result holds. In other words, if firms are
homogeneous, emission intensity regulation works as well as the tax-revenue refund pol-
icy, even without tradable permits (or, equivalently, without joint implementation across
the firms). Moreover, we can show that this result does not depend on the assumption
of perfect competition. If we consider Cournot competition among symmetric firms, our
result holds as long as the government commits t and s or θ before firms choose their
actions.5
Our equivalence result holds only when the government refunds the tax revenue to
the consumers in the same market, proportional to the consumption level. For example,
if the government refunds tax revenue for tax reduction in other markets or for reduction
of payments that are independent of the electricity consumption level, carbon pricing re-
stricts the electricity consumption more strongly than does emission intensity regulation.6
Thus, the two policies yield different consequences for welfare and the environment.7
5The formal proof is available upon request. If the government chooses s after qi and ai are determined
by the firms, each firm i strategically increases qi for increasing s, and thus the equivalence result does
not hold under imperfect competition. If we consider Cournot competition including asymmetric firms,
the equivalence does not hold because firms have market power in the permit market. See von der Fehr
(1993). However, for any level of t, the emission intensity regulation can yield the same outcomes as
those under the tax-revenue refund policy if the permit price is fixed at the carbon tax rate t. This
implies that firms’ market power in the product market does not affect our conclusion.
6In this case, we can prove that to attain the same level of permit price as the carbon tax, emission
intensity regulation yields a larger total output than carbon pricing (without refunding) does.
7Prior literature compared carbon pricing (without refunding) and emission intensity regulation, and
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